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ABSTRACT
Interest in put and call option transactions has in-
creased markedly in recent years. However, serious study of the
option market has been hampered by a lack of reliable data. The
author has been an active option writer for over five years, and
through his broker has obtained records of over 10,000 actual
transactions. These records have been systematically tran-
scribed and verified into what is thought to be a highly reli-
able data base.
Call options of six months plus ten days' duration,
numbering 1665, were selected for study. The Sharpe capital
asset pricing model was a good framework for evaluating the way
in which risks and expected returns can be exchanged between op-
tion traders. Three portfolio strategies were compared, both
excluding and including transaction costs (brokerage commissions,
estimated markup of put and call dealers, and transfer taxes).
These were: (1) hold the underlying stock, (2) hold the stock
and sell a call, (3) buy a call.
Linear regression analysis was used to investigate the
relationship of the returns from each strategy to the returns
from the Standard and Poor index. Strategy (2) was markedly
less sensitive than (1) to changes in the Standard and Poor
index, while strategy (3) was markedly more sensitive than
(1). Transaction costs for option traders were found to be very
high relative to strategy (1), with the impact falling most
heavily on option buyers. It appears that an otherwise fair
game has been converted into a substantial gamble for the option
buyer. The conclusion is that option trading is a highly effec-
tive but quite inefficient means of transferring leverage on the
market return.
Other conclusions reached were that the variance of past
price changes was the most important factor in option pricing
(duplicating the findings of St. Peter), and that inside infor-
mation appeared not to be a significant factor.
Thesis Supervisor: Myron S. Scholes
Title: Assistant Professor of Finance
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
It is estimated that no more than one percent. of
investors purchase puts and calls, and that an even smaller
number sell them. Certainly less than two percent of ex-
change transactions are the result of the exercise of these
options. However, it has been reported that option trading
has increased as a percentage of total transactions in
recent years, which means that, in absolute numbers, options
have increased enormously. Evidence of this interest, is
the opening of option departments in certain large broker-
age firms, and, most. recently, the announcement. of the
Chicago Board of Trade that it. intends to establish an
option trading market.1
This writer has been an active option seller for
the past five years, having sold about 400 options during
IPublic Policy Aspects of a Futures-Type Market
in Options on Securities, A report prepared for the Chicago
Board of Trade by Robert R. Nathan Associates, Inc.,
November, 1969.
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that. time. I agree with the various writers who report,
the option market to be very interesting, but little un-
derstood. It is also true that, a major problem for seri-
ous students has been a lack of reliable data about actual
transactions. The data developed for this study will sub-
stantially fill that, void, and I hope will add to an under-
standing of the objectives and behavior of the participants
in this market.
Option trading is currently done by means of
imperfect negotiation between option buyers and option
sellers, working through brokers and put and call dealers.
It is a competitive market, responsive to supply and demand,
but characterized by imperfect communications. The option
seller undertakes an obligation at the time he writes a
contract. Therefore, in order to protect the option
buyer, each contract must. be endorsed by a Stock Exchange
member firm which guarantees performance. A number of
brokerage houses willing to do such endorsing have estab-
lished departments to service their option writing clients.
The option writer maintains a margin account there, in
which he usually conducts other business as well.
The put, and call dealers are not members of the
Exchange. They either maintain an inventory of options
available for sale, or they seek writers for options that
are currently in demand. The option is delivered through
any broker representing the buyer. A contract is usually
agreed to in telephone negotiations between a broker rep-
resenting one or the other principal and the dealer acting
as a middleman. The dealer makes a markup between the
price he pays and the price he gets. The brokers generate
income through the commissions that result, if the options
are ever exercised.
The data for this thesis came from the daily
diaries of my broker covering the period from mid 1966
through 1969. During this period the details are listed
for over 10,000 transactions representing the option seller,
and over 1,000 representing the option buyer. A major part
of the work of the thesis has been the transcribing, cor-
recting and verifying of this data base. (See Chapter III
on data preparation.)
Rather than describe the terminology, and all the
complex details of option trading, I refer the reader who
is unfamiliar to a basic work, such as R. J. Kruizenga,
9"Introduction to the Option Contract."2 The option field
is not, without authors--in fact they cover a rather wide
variety of approaches. I will describe the ones I have
read that were useful in developing my thinking.
Kruizenga continues with "Profit. Returns From Purchasing
Puts and Calls," 3 in which he analyzed the profits pos-
sible to buyers of calls from 1946 to 1956. The study
suffers, typically, from a data reliability point of view,
as it is based on nominal prices (not. actual transactions),
reported to the Securities and Exchange Commission by put,
and call dealers. Further, it leaves unanswered the
rationality of the option seller. He asks, essentially,
if this was profitable for call buyers over a ten year
period, why did sellers continue t~o provide opt-ions?
In "Some Evidence of the Profitability of Trading
in Put, and Call Options," A. James Boness analyzes some
actual transactions. However, the sample is so small, that
it is questionable what the significance of the results
2 In The Random Character of Stock Market Prices,
ed. by P. H. Cootner, pp. 377-391.
3 ibid., pp. 392-411.
4 Ibid., pp. 475-496.
might be. He found large losses for option buyers, and
significant profits for sellers--if they employed a com-
plex strategy. As he says:
. . . very large numbers of options of all types
must be collected over each of many years before
one is free to generalize with much confidence
on the profitability of option trading.
There are several authors dealing with strategies.
These range from a thoughtful pragmatic approach, pri-
marily for option sellers,5 to the complex simulations
and sixteen strategies of Malkiel and Quandt.6 And
finally, there are works that deal with pricing models
based on probability distributions, which try to compute
the "fair" premium for an option. Among the best of
these is C. M. Sprenkle, "Warrant Prices as Indicators
of Expectations and Preferences." 7 His mathematical
derivations and conclusions are equally applicable to
options, because a warrant is nothing but, an option of
longer duration. Furthermore, warrants are actively
5 Z. A. Dadekian, The Strategy of Puts and Calls.
B. G. Malkiel and R. E. Quandt, Strategies and
Rational Decisions in the Securities Options Market.
7N. 2, pp. 412-474.
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traded on the American Stock Exchange, where their price
behavior, relative to the underlying stock, can easily
be studied. (But, be forewarned that, Sprenkle is not,
light reading, as the mathematics becomes quite difficult.)
Using the Sprenkle formulas, St. Peter8 compared
actual premiums paid for some 1,200 options with their
calculated theoretical values. He found that in the
aggregate the actual premiums were about, the same as those
calculated by the model. However, there was a systematic
discrepancy regarding the weight to be given to the risk
of the underlying stock. (In this sense, risk is synony-
mous with volatility, and is measured by the statistical
variance of stock price percentage changes.) Apparently
to option traders, this "risk" was the principal determinant
of the observed difference between otherwise identical op-
tions. However, St. Peter's calculation indicated that the
weight given to variance was less than half of what it,
should have been. This led to the conclusion that. options
on high volatility stocks are underpriced, and options on
8J. T. St. Peter, "An Estimation Procedure for the
Pricing of Put and Call Stock Options" (unpublished
Master's thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
1969).
low volatility stocks are overpriced. He then showed
that selectively purchasing "underpriced" options and
selling "overpriced" options would have resulted in greater
profits than a random selection.
Such a finding would have very significant, implica-
tions, if confirmed. Therefore, the original intent, of my
study was to investigate this question with the new data
base, which is ten times St.. Peterb sample. Furthermore,
Prof. Myron Scholes, who was an advisor to St. Peter, and
is now my advisor, had developed another variation of the
Sprenkle formula which has somewhat greater intellectual
appeal. However, reporting on such an investigation
(which is currently under way) must wait for publication
in the future, because of a rather mundane discovery.
It became apparent that the transaction costs
(dealer markup, brokerage commissions, and taxes) are very
significant, and can not be tacked on to the option model
as an afterthought. Their impact is not linear, is not
evenly distributed between buyer and seller, and is
affected by the proportion of options that are actually
exercised. Consequently, transaction costs must be made
internal to the model before it can be of much practical
13
significance. Therefore, the direction of this study has
been turned to an analysis of results in a frictionless
market compared to a market, with transaction costs.
The next. chapter describes the scope of the study
as it was actually conducted.
CHAPTER II
SCOPE OF THE STUDY
Data Base and Subset Selection
Reference was made in Chapter I t~o the new, large
set of data on actual option transactions which became
available to me. Further description of the data base,
its preparation for use, and an indication of its accuracy
can be found in Chapter III.
Because of the size of the total data base, it
was possible to select, a narrow subset, that, was large
enough to provide statistically significant results. Six
month plus ten day call options were chosen because they
constitute one of the largest, categories, and because they
are the simplest t~o handle conceptually and analytically.
They have become the most popular option because of tax
considerations, the duration being specifically set to
facilitate achievement, of long term capital gains, but
short term capital losses.9 To further simplify the
analysis, only options written at the existing market
price were used. All transactions represented actual
premiums received by the option seller, transactions at
the option buyer's purchase price being eliminated. This
was done because the broker who supplied the data pri-
marily represented option sellers. Consequently, there
were much fewer data on purchase prices, and it was more
difficult to check their consistency and accuracy.
The Sharpe Capital Asset Pricing Model
The reference frame for study of the option con-
tracts was the Sharpe10 capital asset pricing model. I
will restate the equation used, but not go into the details
of its derivation. The equation will be useful in
9An option is a capital asset which can be bought
or sold, as well as exercised. If the holder has a loss,
he can sell it, just short of six months, to his broker
for a nominal sum. If he has a profit, he can sell it
just after six months for its value less transaction costs.
loW. F. Sharpe, "Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of
Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk," Journal of
Finance, XIX (September, 1964), 425-42.
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evaluating the relationship between risk and expected
return for various option trading strategies.
RET = RF + BETA (RMK-RF) + ERR
Where:
RET is the return to be expected from any security during
a given time period.
RF is the risk free interest rate during the same period.
I used a six month borrowing rate of 0.035 and lend-
rate of 0.030. These compare t~o commercial paper
rates which varied from 0.0275 to 0.0325 during the
years in question.
RMK is the return on the market., which was taken to be the
change in the Standard and Poor 500 stock index, plus
dividends of 0.015 per six months.
BETA is a measure of the covariance of the price of any
security with the market average. From the equation,
it implies proportionality to the amount by which the
expected market return exceeds the risk free rate.
However, for BETA close to 1.0, RF drops out. There-
fore, with some loss of accuracy, BETA can be thought
of as a proportional index of a stock's expected re-
turn relative to the market return. That is, for a
given percentage market return, a stock with BETA = 1.0
would be expected to return the same percentage. A
stock with BETA = 1.5 would be expected to yield ap-
proximately 11 times the market percentage return. A
negative BETA implies percentage changes in the opposite
direction from the market. BETA = 0 implies no correla-
tion between the stock price change and the market
price change.
ERR is an error term, recognizing that stock prices do not
change exactly as predicted by BETA. ERR is a random
variable with a mean of zero, and a variance which is
different. from stock t~o stock.
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The Sharpe model is predicated on investors being
risk averse, and hence requiring a proportionally higher
expected return from increasingly risky assets. The in-
vestor need not be exposed to the entire risk of a secur-
ity. Since the error term in the equation has a mean of
zero, it. is possible by appropriate portfolio diversifica-
tion to eliminate this risk. Historical analysis shows
that, on the average, the error term explains about two-
thirds of the variance of stock prices. However, the risk
represented by BETA, often called systematic risk, is much
more of a problem. There are a few stocks with negative
BETA (such as gold mining stocks), but for practical pur-
poses it is impossible to reduce the BETA of a portfolio
to zero. What Sharpe is really saying, then, is that
investors demand a proportionately higher return for taking
on non-diversifiable risk.
Probability Distribution and
Expected Value of Options
The essence of option trading is the redistribution
of risk and expected return between the option buyer and
option seller. Obviously, they can re-apportion the risk
18
and return of the underlying stock, but they also have a
portfolio opportunity, which I will take up shortly.
Every individual stock has a probability distribution of
future prices. (Strictly speaking, "returns" includes both
dividends and price changes, and the profitability calcu-
lations of this study include both.) Option pricing
models, such as the St. Peter model, have assumed a dis-
tribution that, is mathematically workable. That is, they
assume a random walk, with sequential price changes uncor-
related to each other and fitting (usually) a log-normal
distribution. Further, they assume a stationary underlying
process, whereby estimates of the parameters (especially the
variance of price changes) can be made from historical data.
(Not to be confused with market "chartists" and technicians,
this historical approach gives a prediction of the magni-
tude of price changes, but, not their direction.)
The average investor need not be overly concerned
with the exact probability distribution of each stock.
Under market equilibrium conditions, the present price is
close to the mean of all future price expectations, dis-
counted to present, value. The option traders, however,
are splitting the distribution and selling half of it..
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For the stock holder, who owns both halves of the distribu-
tion, the exact, value of each half is not too important.
For the option trader, the exact value of each half is of
vital concern. The option buyer and seller are playing a
"zero sum game" relative to the price changes of the under-
lying stock. For example, in the call contract, the buyer
has purchased all rights to positive returns, for a sum
known as the premium. In exchange for this premium, the
seller (assuming that he owns the stock) agrees to accept
all negative returns. 11 When the time for settlement.
comes, whether it be at expiration date or sooner, the
dollar returns of buyer and seller must add up exactly to
the dollar return on the underlying stock. If the premium
is not. equal to the expected value of the upper half of
the probability distribution, the game will obviously be
biased against one or the other trader, in terms of dollar
returns.
However, such a bias may in fact be fair, consider-
ing the traders' individual attitudes toward risk. It is
11 In case the option writer does not own the stock,
it is even more clearly a zero sum game, for the buyer's
gain is directly the seller's loss.
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obvious that net risk has been transferred from the option
seller to the option buyer, relative to holding the under-
lying stock itself. For the option seller, any negative
returns accruing to the stock will be reduced by the amount
of the premium received. For the option buyer, if any
negative return accrues to the stock, his total investment
(the premium) is lost. Under Sharpe's assumption of the
risk averse investor, this implies that the option seller
has an expectation of lower returns than from holding the
stock. If the option buyer is also risk averse, he must
expect higher returns. However, it is quite possible that
the option buyer is not, risk averse. He may be willing to
take a lower expected return, because the option gives him
a very skewed distribution, with the probability of a few
huge returns. (Analogous to the gambler who is quite will-
ing to bet, repeatedly against the house odds.)
Finally, compensation for higher risk must be
viewed from portfolio consideration. As Sharpe dis-
cussed,12 the total risk of an asset is not, to be re-
flected in expected return, but only that, part of the risk
12Op. cit., p. 440.
21
which can not, be diversified away. The option buyer,
unless he is a one shot, gambler, must be concerned about,
the correlation of returns from a portfolio of options
with the market return.
For these reasons, it is not, clear, a priori,
exactly where equilibrium will be reached, but it will
surely have some close relationship to the "expected value"
of the option. The expected value is the summation of the
dollar values of all stock prices above the striking
price, weighted by the probability of their occurrence.
The most important determinant of the weighting is the
anticipated magnitude of price changes. This anticipation
may be measured precisely by the statistician as variance,
or subjectively by the trader as volatility. One more
criterion for the trader, of course, may be the possession
of real or imagined "special information." One analysis
will be run to examine this latter question.
Pricing of Options
The premium actually paid is what, traders saw to
reflect the fair relationship to expected value of the
22
option. It, will be informative to investigate what, factors
most influence option traders in determining the premium.
In order to do so, I used an historical data base as-
sembled by Professor Myron Scholes, which was stored on a
computer disk. It, contained the daily returns of the
Standard and Poor Index and of some 3,000 stocks, for the
period July 1, 1962 to July 1, 1969 (daily returns being
defined as today's closing price divided by yesterday's
closing price, minus 1.000000). Assuming these data to
be available to the option trader up to the date the option
was written, two statistics were calculated for every op-
tion contract.
These were the beta, as in the Sharpe model, and
the standard deviation of returns. The standard deviation
is a six month prediction, calculated as follows: calculate
the variance of daily returns, multiply by the number of
market days in the ensuing option duration, take the
square root. For most of the options in the sample, the
historical data were available from July 1, 1962, and no
options were included if there were less than one year's
data.
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It, should be mentioned that the statistics were
calculated using all available data, and there is no
representation that this gave the optimum time period. No
way was known to pick a more relevant, span, because of two
conflicting circumstances. Choosing a shorter period in-
creases the sampling error, assuming a stationary under-
lying statistical process. But, choosing a longer period
raises increasing doubts about, the stationarity of the
process itself, due to mergers, rapid growth, and other
major changes in the nature of a corporation.
For every option contract, the relationships were
calculated between the actual premiums and these statistics.
As in most. other option studies, dollar premiums were con-
verted to percentage of striking price, for meaningful com-
parison. Linear, least-squares regressions were run to
determine the relationships between percentage premium and
subsequent six month returns on the stock. The hypothesis
here was that. if people had worthwhile special information,
they would bid up the price of call options in order to
take advantage. The results of these analyses are dis-
cussed in Chapter V.
-~ U w
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Profitability: Three Strategies
for Comparison
We turn now to the profitability of option trading,
given that, the traders did in some manner agree to the
premium. I will compare the results of three possible
strategies for investors who expect positive stock returns:
1. Buy the stock and hold it six months plus
ten days. (Purchase on margin, with 80%
investment., borrow the balance at the risk-
free borrowing rate.)
2. Buy the stock and sell a call on it. (Purchase
on margin, the investment. being equal to 80%
minus the premium received, and borrow the
remaining 20% at the risk-free rate.)
3. Buy a call on the stock (Investment is the
premium paid.)
Assume that, the investors dealt in a single round lot, of
each of the 1,665 transactions offered. Investment for
each strategy was calculated as described above. Returns
were obtained from the Scholes Returns disk, previously
described, deducting only the margin interest costs.
Histograms were plotted showing the distribution of
25
returns on investments for the three strategies. From
them, it, is quite apparent how the total risk was appor-
tioned between option buyer and option seller. From the
sums of the three strategies, the overall returns on in-
vestment were calculated. Finally, scatter plots were
made relating the returns on investments for each trans-
action to the return of the market average for the same
period. Linear, least-squares regressions were run in
order to determine the sensitivity of each strategy to
the market risk. These three regression lines, plotted
on the same chart, allow some interesting conclusions to
be reached concerning the way in which option traders ap-
portion the systematic portfolio risk between themselves.
However, the conclusions are more interesting for
what might have been, rather than valuable for what really
happened. They present a view of the frictionless world,
and we must be very cautious before making any judgments
about rationality of behavior. Therefore, the regressions
were run again, this time taking account of all transac-
tion costs (described in some detail in Chapter IV). These
comparisons, as well as the sums of returns on investments,
lead to some rather different conclusions than in the
26
frictionless case.
Subsequent chapters now describe in more detail
the preparation of the option transaction data base, the
estimation of transaction costs, and the results of the
analyses which have just been described.
--W
CHAPTER III
PREPARATION OF THE DATA BASE
The universal complaint of students of the option
market, has been the shortage of data about, actual trans-
actions. Analyses of the costs and profitability of
various strategies have of necessity suffered because of
small sample size, data of unknown reliability, or the use
of nominal prices (put, and call dealers' quotations, which
may or may not reflect. actual transactions). For example,
in the Nathan Associates report, to the Chicago Board of
Trade,13 a contemplated mathematical model was abandoned
"due to the dearth of data on the existing option market
. . ." Recognizing, then, the unique opportunity pre-
sented by the data available for this study, and recogniz-
ing my own unique position for determining its accuracy, a
great, deal of effort went into data preparation. In fact,
much more time went. into data preparation than into
13Op. cit.., p. x.
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subsequent analysis. Consequently, the data base is
available for future analytical work that is beyond the
scope of the present simple study. Therefore, I will
describe in more than usual detail what. was done to pre-
pare it.
The raw data is by no means perfect, as will be
seen from the ensuing discussion, but I believe that in
its final form, it. will prove to be highly reliable and
useful. The basic data obtained were the diaries of a
major New York option broker (who chooses at this time
not to be identified) for the years 1966 through 1969.
They contain the details of every option contract
handled by the firm, arranged in chronological order by
expiration date. The entries are in long hand, sometimes
hastily written, apparently copied at the end of each work-
ing day from the original transaction slips prepared as the
contracts were made. The record includes:
expiration date
contract writing dat-e
number of round lots of stock involved
type of option (put, call, straddle, strip, or strap)
representing (whether the option buyer, or
option seller)
End
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ticker symbol
striking price
premium paid or received
name of put and call dealer representing the
opposite side
name of the trader making the contract,
date of option exercise (if at all)
One key piece of information not recorded was the
market price at the time the contract. was written. This
omission necessitated extensive stock price look-up later,
as will be discussed. All dat.a (except. the trader's
name) were key punched ont.o 80 column cards, either di-
rect-ly from the diary, or from intermediate tabulating
sheets. This produced 11,800 cards, broken down by
expiration date:
1966 . . . . 480 (all complete entries. Most
entries prior to August did
not contain the premium paid)
1967 . . 4,000 (approx.) (all entries in the
diary)
1968 . . . . 6,000 (approx.) (all entries in the
diary)
1969 . . . . 1,435 (50% sample of options expired
prior to July 1)
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Five separate systematic runs will be described by which it
is thought, that most erroneous entries have been removed.
(From a glance at, the diaries, it, is obvious that, tran-
scription errors were inevitable.)
The first, screening was a computer run to check
completeness and validity of the characters punched in
each column of the card. Approximately 50 incomplete
cards were discarded, and 100 key punching errors were
corrected.
On the next, run, the ticker symbols were searched
against the list, of 3,044 stocks contained in the Scholes
daily "Returns" disk. This removed 807 entries with
symbols that, could not be found. About two-thirds of the
rejects have enough entries t~o conclude that they are
valid, but. for some reason are not on the Returns disk
(over the counter stocks, newly listed, changed ticker
symbol, etc.). Since the balance of rejects may be
transcribing errors, it is informative to estimate the
proportion of errors that would be caught by this test.
There are 3,000 symbols on file, out of over 18,000 pos-
sible three letter combinations. Therefore, five-sixths
of randomly generated errors should be caught.
N
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The remaining entries (10,900) were sorted by
ticker symbol and put into chronological order by t.he
writing date of the contracts. All suspicious looking
sequences of striking prices were then compared t~o
monthly-basis stock price charts (and some daily basis
charts that were available). At this step, 225 entries
for warrants were removed, since no warrant data is avail-
able on the Returns disk. An additional 220 entries were
deleted because an error obviously exist-ed. The nature of
the errors could have been ticker symbol, date, or price
entry gross enough to show up against monthly charts.
The next step was to calculate an approximate
expected premium for each option. This was done using
chart.s of historical average premiums for three month and
six month calls, puts, and straddles. 14 Adjustments for
other durations were made using a factor equal to the
square root of the relative durations. At the same time,
the writing and expiration dat.es were searched against, the
calendar of the Returns disk. Options are always written
and always expire on a day when the stock market is open.
Z. A. Dadekian, The Strategy of Put.s and Calls,
pp. 98-103.
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Consequently, failure to match the Return's calendar
identifies a date error. There were 724 market days out
of 1,096 total days in the study period, or 66%. Thus,
one-third of all random date errors should be caught by
this simple test. A total of 128 date errors were found
and corrected out of 10,460 entries.
The ratio of actual premium to calculated premium
was printed out for every entry. This proved to be a re-
markably useful index for locating suspicious entries.
It wasn't, really that, the ratio usually came out close to
1.0, but that it tended to have a characteristic value
for each stock. Although the characteristic value often
drifted up or down with time, significant deviations were
obvious. At this time, the stocks listed on the American
Exchange (2,390) were separated for later work, and not
included in the analyses of this study. Working with the
ISL Daily Stock Data for the New York Exchange, and refer-
ring again to the broker's diaries, approximately 1,800 of
the remaining 8,068 entries were double checked. This was
really a detective job where my own experience as an option
trader was very useful. Many of the errors were glaring--
such as miscopied data, misplaced decimal point, and total
premium for more than one option entered as if it. were for
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only one. Others were more subtle, yielding only to
careful analysis of the patterns of entries in the
diaries--such as similar options on the same or consequtive
days, or even to identifying penmanship patterns on some of
the numbers. However, I felt that a high degree of detail
was necessary, for we were working with the data points
that. lie far from the mean, and have a disproportionate
effect on variances and correlations. It was important
that we get rid of erroneous data, but it was equally im-
portant. that we not, discard outliers that, really belong
there. In total, 400 errors were found and corrected, and
370 transactions were removed because of some identifiable
defect.. (Of these, in 290 cases the stock did not trade
at the striking price on the option writing date.) An
additional 74 entries were deleted because in my judgment
they were incorrect, although I could not find out what
exactly was wrong.
The final step in preparing the data was to examine
the distribution of contracts by duration. The distribu-
tion showed a distinct. pattern, as expected, with most
options written for certain durations. However, a spread
of durations is observed, for the following reasons:
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(1) options that. would expire on a date when the market
is closed, expire instead on the next following market date.
This can add one, two, and occasionally three extra days.
(2) Transactions executed late in the day sometimes get,
posted the following day, and could appear t~o be one day
short. (3) Months have differing numbers of days. Conse-
quently, options measured in months have differing numbers
of days. The identifiable nominal duration and their actual
spans are listed below, together with the number of contracts
of each duration. Since contracts are often written for more
than one hundred shares, the last column lists the total
round lots involved.
Nominal Duration
1 month . . . . . . . . .
35 days . . . . . . . . .
2 months . . . . . . . .
65 days . . . . . . . . .
3 months . . . . . . . .
95 days . . . . . . . . .
4 months . . . . . . . .
6 months . . . . . . . .
6 months plus 10 days .
9 months . . . . . . . .
12 months . . . . . . . .
12 months plus 10 days .
All others (102 different
durations) . .
Total . . . . . .
Actual
Duration
(Days)
29- 33
34- 38
60- 63
64- 68
90- 93
94- 98
120-123
180-189
190-196
273-280
364-369
375-378
Number of
Contracts
54
200
41
677
120
1,420
14
141
4,340
23
324
49
221
7,624
Number of
Round Lots
83
363
66
1,025
146
2,048
21
205
6,460
51
500
91
337
11,396
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The peaked nature of this distribution affords one
last method of reducing errors. If date errors are randomly
distributed, then the background error level is very low.
If we were to assume that half the options of odd duration
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are really date errors (quite unlikely), then the -2-
options covering 102 odd durations is equivalent to 1.1 per
duration. Thus, when we analyze 6 month 10 day options
covering durations of 190 to 196 days, the error rate
caused by dates is likely to be less than 7 x 1.1 or less
than 8 date errors in 4,340 transactions.
Having selected these 4,340 contracts as the basis
for the analytical work of this study, I tested for ac-
curacy against a known sample. During the data period, I
had personally been the writer of 68 option contracts of
6 months 10 days. When checked against the final data
base, the results were:
62 recorded and copied perfectly
2 "latee" transactions, recorded the following
day
1 date error screened out by the 190-196 day
cut-off (recorded correctly, but 10 day
error in copying)
1 ticker symbol changed; not on Return disk
1 ticker symbol recorded as another stock;
screened out, on price consistency test
1 not recorded in diary
CHAPTER IV
TRANSACTION COSTS
Transact-ion costs for the option trader have an
impact greater than for most stock traders. The results
of this study indicate that transaction costs are large
enough to substantially distort the results anticipated
from a frictionless model--in fact, large enough to thwart,
in the aggregate, the objectives of the rational option
buyer. Since the extent, of this impact, has not, been fully
analyzed in previous studies, I will proceed in some de-
tail. The possible amount of transaction costs for any
single trade are either known, or can be estimated. But
not. all options are exercised, so not all possible transac-
tion costs are actually expended. Therefore, the most
interesting aspect is the way in which these costs sum up
for a typical portfolio. First., I will describe the cal-
culation of costs used in this study.
37
The two major costs are brokerage commissions and
put and call dealer markup. The former may be calculated
exactly, but. the latter must be estimated. The commission
rat.e tables for the New York and American Exchanges are
widely available, but the equations are restat.ed here for
completeness. (The figures quot-ed are those in use during
the time of this study, and do not include the recent
surcharge on trades of less than 1,000 shares. The sur-
charge adds $15 or 50% of the commission, whichever is
less.)
P=stock price per share Commission per 100 shares
$4 to 24 $7 + P
$24 to 50 $19+P/2
Over $50 $39 +P/10
Maximum charge $75
In the typical call transaction, if the price
rises the option writer experiences two commissions, as
does the option buyer, assuming that he disposes of the
shares he receives. If the price declines, the option
buyer has no commissions. The writ-er has two commissions
if he disposes of the stock used to cover the option, one
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if he keeps the covering stock, and none if the option was
not covered.
The mark up for the put and call dealer varies, de-
pending on the supply and demand at the moment., and on the
degree of competition between dealers. It tends to become
standardized at some lower than average figure for popular
stocks, and rises proportionately as there is less active
interest, less communication of bids between buyer and
seller, and less competition. Brokers state that the
dealers' markup is as much or more than the brokerage com-
mission. One would estimate from the disparity between
the bid and asked prices in the dealer advertisements that,
it is in fact, greater than the commission. Malkiel and
Quandt15 use $62.50 as the average markup on a $50 stock
(compared t~o $44 brokerage commission). In this study,
I use 1.5 times the brokerage commission, and of course
the purchaser pays it whether or not he ever exercises the
option.
Certain other relatively minor costs exist, one
being New York transfer tax, which is charged t~o the call
Op. cit., p. 17.
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buyer whether or not a stock transaction ever results.
There is no tax on a put. (Federal transfer tax is no
longer applicable, and the SEC fee of 1/500 of 1% is too
small to include.)
Stock Price New York Tax Per 100 Shares
$5 to $9.99 $2.50
$10 to $19.99 $3.75
$20 or more $5.00
There are substantial costs involved in the con-
version of a put to a call, but these are reflected in the
difference in premium received by the option seller. Re-
member that, it is always possible for the option dealer
to "sell" a put to a conversion house, and buy back a call,
for a differential only slightly greater than the risk-
free borrowing rate on the value of the underlying stock.
This is so, because the converter, holding a put, and one
hundred shares against the call he delivered, is in a
161risk-free position.16 The estimates of conversion cost~s
16An extensive discussion of conversion theory,
both put to call and call to put, could be found in the Jour-
nal of Finance, December, 1969. "The Relationship between
Put and Call Option Prices," Hans. R. Stoll.
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used in this study are as follows: The interest part, of
the charge is calculated at, 7% per year, which was approxi-
mately the rate charged on brokerage margin accounts. An
additional 2% per year rate is charged as the converter's
administrative fee. Finally, one transfer tax is charged,
as shown in the previous table, and two floor brokerage
commissions are charged according to the following table.
(Conversion houses are Stock Exchange member firms, and
pay these rates on their own transactions.)
Floor Brokerage Per 100 Shares
Stock Price (Charged twice for conversion)
$5- $9.99 $4.20
$10- $19.99 $6.20
$20- $39.99 $7.30
$40- $99.99 $7.70
$100- $149.99 $8.70
The charges for conversion have been determined
in the following manner for the strategies where the option
writer sold straddles, but the option buyer purchased
calls. In the frictionless case, the call buyer has been
charged the straddle premium plus the interest, (3.5% for
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six months). For the full cost, case, taxes, floor
brokerage, and converter fee are all charged, as well as
put. and call dealer markup on the two calls.
Since we cannot, know completely the actual de-
cisions made by option traders, the following arbitrary
rules were applied for uniform evaluation of the strate-
gies which include transactions costs. The option buyer
is assumed always t~o dispose of stock at the price exist,-
ing on the option expiration date. He holds no long or
short, stock positions. The option writer, whether he
is pursuing a covered or naked strategy for calls or
straddles, experiences double commissions if the option
is exercised, and none if it is not. exercised. An ex-
ample will illustrate the use of these tables and rules.
The option seller receives $500.00 for a six month straddle
at a striking price of $20. In the frictionless model,
the option buyer pays $500.00 + (.035)(2000.) = $570.00
for two calls. In the real world, however:
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Straddle . . . . . . . . . .
Interest on $2,000 . . . . .
Conversion fee on $2,000 .
Floor brokerage charges .
Transfer tax on two calls
Put, and call dealer
markup (approx.) . . . .
($7.00 + $20.00) x 2 x 1 )
. $500.00
. 70.00
. 20.00
. 14.60
. 10.00
. 81.00
$695.60 for two
calls
Assuming that the price rises to 24, and the calls are
exercised, the option seller incurs a buying and a selling
commission totaling $54.00. The option buyer incurs two
commissions and an additional transfer tax on each call
exercised, or ($20 + 7 + 24 + 7 + 5) x 2 = $126.00. In
the frictionless world, the writer's profit was $500.00,
and the buyer's profit was $230.00. But in the real world,
the transaction costs reduced the writer's profit to $446.00
and turned the buyer's profit to a loss ($800.00 -$695.60
-$126.00 = -$21.60).
The above example is more complicated than neces-
sary for an understanding of the study reported in this
1
3%%-
1%
2
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paper. Since time did not allow completion of the straddle
analysis, the reader can ignore such costs as conversion
fee and floor brokerage. However, all the detail will be
necessary for further work using this data base. Conse-
quently, I decided to leave the discussion as it stands,
rather than simplify it to calls alone.
CHAPTER V
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
Procedures and Computer Programming
All computation was done on a time sharing system,
consisting of an IBM model 360-67 located at the Inter-
active Data Corp., Waltham, Massachusetts. Fortran pro-
grams were written to:
1. Make various calculations and printouts
during the preparation and screening of
the data base.
2. Access the Scholes Returns disk and calcu-
late each beta, predicted standard devia-
tion of returns, and actual return on both
the stock and the market average.
3. Calculate each investment, profit, and return
on investment, for the three strategies.
Transaction costs were neglected on one run
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and deducted on the other, as described
in detail in Chapter IV.
Prepackaged programs were available from Professor Scholes
for running linear regressions, plotting scatter diagrams,
and printing histograms. Figures 1 through 18 are photo-
static reproductions of the histograms and scatter diagrams,
the formats of which are now described.
Referring to the histogram, such as Figure 1, the
variable range for which the distribution is desired is
divided into twenty equal classes. The twenty-two figures
across the top of the histogram represent, from left to
right, the number of items falling below range, within
each class, and above range. The eleven figures across
the bottom represent the starting values of the first,
third, fifth, etc., classes, and the ending value of the
twentieth class. The height of each bar of asterisks is
proportional to the number of items in that class.
Referring to the scatter diagram, such as Figure 6,
the variable ranges are selected by the computer program
to exactly fill the space available. The upper and lower
limits, and the smallest scale divisions are listed in the
heading. Each point is marked by an asterisk. If more
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than one point falls in the same place, a number is printed,
representing the number of additional points. An X repre-
sents six or more points. The mean of each variable is
printed in the heading, and their intersection is marked
with an M on the diagram. The least-squares regression
line is calculated in the form Y - A +BX, and the coeffi-
cients are printed in the top row. STD. ERROR is the
standard deviation of the coefficient B. RESVAR is the
residual variance of Y, which has not been explained by
the regression. CORR is the correlation coefficient be-
tween X and Y.
Option Pricing Results
The histograms in Figures 1-4 show the distribu-
tions of striking price, historical standard deviation of
returns, historical beta, and percentage premium for each
optioned stock. The regressions in Figures 5-7 show the
relationship of the premium to standard deviation, to beta,
and to subsequent realized returns on the stock. Comments
on each figure follow:
Figure 1, Distribution of Striking Prices
Call options were written on stocks selling from
$6 to $370 per share. However, the median was $27, only
about half the price of an average share on the New York
Stock Exchange--clearly not a random sample of stocks.
The reason for the low median is probably a bias toward
higher risk stocks, which tend to be lower priced. (A
scatter diagram did show negative correlation between
price and standard deviation. However, the scatter was
quite wide, indicating that price alone is a poor proxy
for risk.) A bias to higher risk stocks can be expected,
considering that transaction costs are substantial (a
finding to be discussed later). On risky stocks, the per-
centage premium should be relatively higher, and conse-
quently the transaction costs relatively lower.
Figure 2, Distribution of Standard Deviation of Six Month
Returns on Stock
Historical data shows that call options were
written on stocks with a median six month standard devia-
tion of 0.23, which is considerably above the Stock
Exchange average of about 0.17. The range is very wide,
from 0.10 for American Telephone to 0.65 for Benguet, but
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the bias is obviously toward stocks of higher than average
risk.
Figure 3, Distribution of Beta of Optioned Stock
Once again, the range is very wide, from -0.8 for
a few mining stocks to +3.0 for Fairchild Camera. The
median of 1.4 is substantially above the average beta,
which is 1.0 by definition.
Figure 4, Distribution of Percentage Premiums for Six
Month Call Options
The percentage premiums range from about 8% to 22%,
with a median of 12.3%.
Figure 5, Regression of Percentage Premium on Standard
Deviation
This figure shows a significant relationship be-
tween the premium paid and the standard deviation of the
stock returns (correlation coefficient = 0.59)
Percentage Prem. = .0836 + (.1869)(Std. Dev.)
For comparison, the results of St. Peter's17 regressions
are also shown. (Since his regressions were run against
variance, taking the square root causes curved plots on
1 70p._cit., p. 68.
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my coordinates.) His theoretical option value, calculated
from a hypothesized probability distribution, is also
plotted. Clearly, the results with the new data come much
closer to St. Peter's actual results than to his calculated
value. Apparently, whatever subjective reasoning option
traders use to determine premiums, standard deviation is a
reasonably good proxy for it. Whether or not they give it
enough weight is still an open question, and not within the
scope of the present study. The magnitude of the intercept,
A, is another striking difference between the calculated and
actual premiums. I believe that failure to account for
transaction costs in the model is a primary factor in this
difference.
Figure 6, Regression of Percentage Premium on Beta
This figure suggests a slight positive relationship
to beta, but the correlation coefficient is very low
(0.098). From this regression, it is doubtful that option
traders give any significant weight to beta in setting
premiums. This is a rather unexpected result, because
from the previous discussion, beta represents a substantial
part of the risk--especially the part that can not be
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diversified away. Therefore, this relationship should be
further studied. (One valid change in the regression,
that would improve the correlation, would be elimination
of the negative betas. Clearly, one wouldn't pay a
negative premium for a negative beta!)
Figure 7, Regression of Percentage Premium on Realized
Returns
The realized returns refer to changes in the stock
price, not to returns for any investment strategy. These
two variables appear to be uncorrelated (correlation
coefficient = 0.057). The hypothesis here was that call
traders with special knowledge about a stock would bid up
the price of calls. If they were right, the returns on
the stock would be more positive than expected. The ob-
served result suggests that special knowledge either is
not significantly useful, or that it is present in too
small an amount to be detected. It does not preclude the
possibility that option traders in general have knowledge
superior to random stock buyers, that, causes optioned
stocks to have a higher return than random stocks!
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Profitability Results
The histograms of Figures 8-11 show the distribu-
tion of returns of the market average, and the return on
investment for each of the three strategies, neglecting
transaction costs. The pictures tell the story, and in
general show just what we expected about the division of
risk on any transaction. (Recall that the market return
is the fractional change in the Standard and Poor index
over the six month ten day period, adding 0.015 as the
implied dividend. The three strategies are (1) buy stock
on 80% margin, (2) buy stock on 80% margin, sell a call,
(3) buy a call.)
However, a completely unexpected result is the
high rate of return on this group of stocks relative to
the market average. Recalling the market model equation
(Chapter II), RET = RF + BETA (RMK-RF) + ERR.
Taking RF = 0.03, median RMK = 0.07, median BETA = 1.4,
corrected to 1.75 for 80% margin, and assuming that
overall ERR = 0 for 1,665 transactions,
Expected Return = 0.030 + 1.75(0.070-0.030) = 0.10
Actual median return for strategy (1) was 0.14, and actual
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mean return was 0.175, either way substantially greater
than predicted. It is highly improbable that this result
occurred by chance in so large a sample. This result sug-
gests either that option traders overall had superior spe-
cial information, or that the underlying statistical pro-
cess changed during this period of market history. In
view of the non-correlation between option premiums and
stock returns (Figure 7), and some personal feel for the
diversity of sophistication of option traders, I greatly
doubt the special information hypothesis. The most likely
explanation is that, during this time (mostly 1967 and 1968),
investor expectations changed significantly upward under
the influence of growing inflationary psychology. This
put more favor on growth, technology, and acquisition
oriented companies at the expense of traditional or former
growth industries. My hypothesis would be that this
caused a widening of the risk spectrum, and specifically
that stocks which formerly had a high beta were upwardly
valued during this period, relative to all stocks in the
market average. Note, for example, that during the three
year span of these data, the Standard and Poor index rose
14% from 85.8 to 97.5. Meanwhile, the Dow Jones Industrial
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Average barely managed a gain from 878 to 880. Since the
Dow Jones stocks are included in the Standard and Poor
index, it follows that other subsets of stocks must have
done considerably better than the Standard and Poor index.
These alternate hypotheses could readily be checked using
the data on the Scholes Returns disk. I think this sit-
uation does not detract. substantially from the findings
about risk and return apportionment among option traders.
Transaction costs were found to have a marked
effect. Because this effect was most pronounced for the
call buyer, Figure 12 was included, which is a histogram
of the returns from the call buying strategy, deducting
transaction costs. Figures 13-18 are scatter diagrams
of the returns from the strategies, neglecting and de-
ducting transaction costs, plotted against, market return
for the same period. The best fit regression lines are
drawn through the data points. Calculations of the sum
of investment, profit, and return on investment were made
for each strategy, assuming one round lot, of each trans-
action. A summary of the regression results and the
strategy sums appears in Table 1.
TABLE 1
RETURNS FROM VARIOUS STRATEGIES
Portfolio Summations Regressions of Investment Returns vs.Market Return, RET = A + B(RMK)
Strategy
Total Total Six Month A B Standard Correlation
Investment Profit Returns Error of B Coefficient
1 buy stock $5,249,000 $775,000 14.8% .068 1.758 .126 .325
1A buy stock 5,249,000 664,000 12.7% .031 1.752 .125 .325
2 buy stock 4,415,000 447,000 10.1% .087 .685 .047 .335sell call
2A buy stock 4,415,000 373,000 8.5% .061 .618 .044 .328sell call
3 buy call 834,000 328,000 39.4% -.013 7.300 .639 .270
3A buy call 943,000 134,000 14.2% -.228 6.074 .543 .265
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I make the following notes and comments regarding
the results shown in Table 1:
1. The exact results of strategies with transac-
tion costs depends on the details assumed. The
strategies are representative of those followed
by many option traders. In strategy 1A, the
stock is bought at the striking price and sold
at the market price on the day of expiration.
In strategy 2A, stock is bought and sold at
the striking price, if the call is exercised.
If the call is not exercised, the stock is
held for possible sale of another option
against it. Thus, on average, two commissions
are charged if call is exercised, no commis-
sions if not exercised. In strategy 3A, stock
is disposed of at the market price if call is
exercised. Otherwise, no commission costs.
However, put and call dealer markup is paid
at the time a call is purchased. Therefore,
dealer markup is both an increase of invest-
ment, and a transaction cost.
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2. Notice that the regressions were run directly
on market return, rather than using Sharpe's
adjustment for the risk-free rate. Thus B is
similar to, but not identical to beta. Regres-
sions were also run in the form:
RET. = A + B(RF + BETA. (RMK.-RF))
i = 1 to 1665, the number of transactions.
Correlation coefficients were up to 10% better.
Nevertheless, it was decided to report regres-
sions on market return alone, for the improved
correlation did not seem worth the conceptual
complication.
3. The low correlation coefficients do not cast
doubt on the existence of the relationship.
They do mean that there is a great deal of
residual variance of individual points around
the regression line. Thus, a relatively larger
number of data are necessary to establish the
slope of the regression line. The significance
of the standard error of B is: the probability
is about 65% that the true value of B lies
within one standard error, 95% within two
standard errors, 99% within three, etc.
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4. The regression calculates the best straight
line through the data. Obviously, for
strategies 2 and 3 the relationships are not
linear over the entire range, although it may
be a reasonable approximation in mid-range.
A more accurate approach would be to plot
the means of various sub-ranges of the market
return. Nevertheless, I believe the results
as presented are useful in showing the direc-
tion and approximate extent of the risk
shifting that has taken place.
5. In the regressions, A is the expected yield
of the portfolio if the market average return
were zero. Option traders'expectations must
surely have been greater than zero, because
call buyers had a negative return, in a
frictionless market, even though their set of
stocks substantially outperformed the market.
In the real world, their losses would be
22.8%, considering transaction costs.
6. The coefficient B for strategy 1 is reasonable,
considering that stocks are purchased on 80%
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margin, and that their median beta was 1.40.
This may be evidence that, the higher returns
for this set of stocks was achieved by upward
displacement rather than by a major change in
beta.
7. Clearly, an overwhelming observation from
these results is the degree to which systematic
risk has been transferred from option seller to
option buyer. What the call buyer has as his
portfolio is an asset highly levered on the
returns of the market average.
8. The summations of overall returns look quite
reasonable in the frictionless case. However,
deducting transaction costs, the position of
the call buyer looks unattractive to all but
the hardy gambler. On balance, he barely beat
the returns of the stock buyer, despite the
fact that the median market return was 7%, and
that his stocks outperformed that average by
about 7% more than could have been expected.
Simultaneously, he took on risk that was about
four times the risk of the margin stock buyer.
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9. How far from a zero sum game have the trans-
action costs made option trading? The total
profit available from the underlying stock in
strategy 1 was $775,000. For that person, the
transaction costs were $111,000, or 14.3% of
the gross profit. (As a percent of investment,
just 2.1%.) In strategies 2 and 3, the option
traders contracted to divide the same underly-
ing return. In the frictionless case, the call
seller earned $447,000, or 57.7% of the gross
profit, and the call buyer earned $328,000, or
42.3% of it. The following list shows where
the gross profit went in the case with trans-
action costs:
$ %_
Call seller,
net profit . . .
Call buyer, net
profit .. .. .
Mark up to put and
call dealer
Brokerage and
transfer tax,
call buyer . . .
Brokerage, call
seller . . . . .
373,000
. . 134,000
109,000
. . .85,000
. 74000
775,000
48.1
17.3
14.1
11.0 34.6%
9.5
100.0
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The combined transaction costs, then, were 34.6%
of the gross profit. Of course, this is for a single
portfolio under one set of conditions. If the profit
were higher, the percentage of transaction costs would be
lower. But, how often can one expect the average return
on an underlying stock portfolio to be almost 14% every
six months? Clearly, this is nota typical case, and
one could in fact expect transaction costs to take an even
higher percentage.
For a final comparison of strategies, see Figures
19 and 20. In Figure 19, the regression lines are plotted
for the three strategies without transaction costs. In
Figure 20, they are repeated, deducting costs. In the
frictionless case, the three lines intersect in a point
at a market return of 0.015 and a return on all strategies
of 0.095. This is the point of indifference for an ex-
pected value maximizer. If option trading were friction-
less, then for expected returns below this point,
strategy 2 dominates, and for higher expected returns,
strategy 3 dominates (0.095 is the expected return on a
portfolio of stocks held at 80% margin for six months.
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For the case with transaction costs, there is no
point, but rather a triangular intersection. At the port-
folio return of 0.095, we find a point of indifference
between strategies 2 and 3, but at that point, both are
dominated by strategy 1. In fact, an expected value maxi-
mizer would not engage in option trading at all if the
expected portfolio return were between 0.08 and 0.14. The
most significant factor about the transaction costs is that
they have pushed the indifference point for call buyers up
to a level that is probably unattainable over any sus-
tained period. If call buyers realize this, then they must
be classified as gamblers rather than expected value maxi-
mizers.
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CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The Sharpe capital asset pricing model provides a
good frame of reference for evaluating option trading.
Based on records of 1,665 call options of six months plus
ten days' duration, three portfolio strategies were com-
pared: (1) hold the underlying stock (80% margin),
(2) hold the stock and sell a call, (3) buy a call.
These strategies were compared without transaction costs
and again with transaction costs.
This provided a very useful method of comparison,
because strategies (2) and (3) together are actually a
"zero sum game" relative to strategy (1). That is, the
sum of investments of (2) and (3) and the sum of profits
of (2) and (3) must be exactly the investment and profits
of (1). Likewise the total risk of (1) is divided between
(2) and (3).
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An obvious conclusion is that a great deal of risk
is transferred from strategist (2) to strategist (3). The
histograms of distribution of returns show that strategy
(2) is much narrower than strategy (1), and that strategy
(3) is an order of magnitude wider than either (1) or (2).
In the frictionless world of no transaction costs, the
returns on investments for the three portfolios were, re-
spectively, 14.8%, 10.1%, and 39.4%, per six months, a
seemingly rational distribution. However, transaction
costs for strategy (1) consumed 14.3% of the profits,
whereas for (2) and (3) combined the transaction costs
consumed 34.6% of the same gross profits. The actual re-
turns on investments for the three portfolios were, re-
spectively, 12.7%, 8.5%, and 14.2%, per six months. It
is clear that the call buyer has been most hard hit by the
transaction costs, and that his strategy was, in the aggre-
gate, really thwarted.
These actual results were achieved during a period
when the mean return on the Standard and Poor index was 6%
per six months. Curiously, the mean return on the stocks
in the option sample was 12.7%, substantially greater than
predicted by the market, model. I believe that this
84
discrepancy is due to a general upward evaluation of
higher risk stocks during the period under study (August
1966-June 1969), and not to any special knowledge of option
traders in general.
The random risk of any asset can be diversified
away by portfolio selection, and this is true even of
the enormous variance of the call buying strategy. There-
fore, regressions were run of return on investment against
return on the market average, in order to measure the non-
diversifiable risk. Although the relationships are clearly
not linear at the extremes, still, least-squares linear
regressions yielded significant coefficients. The co-
efficients are analagous to beta in the Sharpe model, as
they are the factor by which percentage changes in the
market average are multiplied to predict percentage
changes in portfolio return. The coefficients for the
three frictionless strategies were, respectively, 1.75,
0.68, and 7.30; and for the cases subtracting transaction
costs 1.75, 0.62, and 6.07.
To state a single conclusion from the foregoing
summary, it appears that, option trading is a highly ef-
fective but quite inefficient means of transferring
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leverage on the returns from the market average. Espe-
cially for the call buyer, the magnitude of the trans-
action costs changes an otherwise fair game to a gamble
in which there is a substantial expectation of loss.
The total variance of returns, taken historically
to the date a contract was written, seems to be a most
important determinant of the option premium. The regres-
sion of percentage premium against total variance approxi-
mately duplicates the relationship found by St. Peter.
Given the high leverage on market return that option
trading provides, it was expected that the covariance of a
stock's return with the market return (beta) would be a
determinant of the premium. It was found that optioned
stocks in general have a higher than average beta (median
1.4), but, surprisingly, that the regression of premium
against, beta was of doubtful significance. In order to
investigate the effect of special knowledge (such as in-
sider information) on the pricing of options, the per-
centage premium was regressed against subsequent returns
on the stock. The relationship was insignificant, indi-
cating either that. the amount of inside information is
small, or that it is not very valuable.
-U
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The total data base prepared for this study is
almost, 10,000 transactions. Since only a small fraction
was analyzed, it is recommended that this study be con-
tinued along the present, lines. An analysis should be
made of profitability, especially considering transaction
costs, for other types of options--puts and straddles,
and for other durations--one, two, three, and twelve
months. There is also the opportunity to extend the
study t~o the end of 1969, and possibly into the severe
downward market, of 1970. Similarly, option pricing models,
such as that proposed by St. Peter, or further revisions
by Professor Scholes, should be pursued considering the
findings of the present. study. It is anticipat-ed that
out of such a combined approach a comprehensive model of
the actual option market can be developed.
